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People and Policy: Behavioural economics and its 
policy implications  
Alex Dickson and Marco Fongoni, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract 
The standard approach of economic modelling and policy analysis is to assume that people are homo 
economicus: a rational and self-interested economic man. However, a well-documented body of 
evidence suggests that human decision makers depart from this assumption in several interesting ways. 
This paper explores three key behavioural aspects – loss aversion; present-biased preferences; and 
social preferences.  It considers the evidence to support them; how behavioural economists have 
modified economic models to capture the implications of each modification; and how they offer new 
insights on the scope and efficacy of a wide range of policy interventions.  
Keywords 
Behavioural economics; loss aversion; reference-dependent preferences; present-biased preferences; 
social preferences; procrastination; reciprocity; public policy 
I Introduction and background 
Economists seek to describe the complexity of the real world by using abstract models of reality. At the 
heart of most models in economics are people who make decisions, and economists therefore have to 
make assumptions about how they behave. The ‘standard economic model’ (“SEM”) in the neoclassical 
tradition is populated by individuals that satisfy the assumptions of ‘homo (or femina) economicus’ – 
rational economic (wo)man – people who understand their preferences; are rational; obey the axioms of 
‘utility theory’; are self-interested; and discount for time in a consistent way. There are some good 
reasons to pursue such an approach. Economists try to develop general models of reality that help 
explain – and predict – (average) behaviour. Its behavioural assumptions don’t have to concur with how 
we conceive that people actually make decisions, but their predictions should be consistent with 
observed behaviour on average. Given the need for generally applicable models, the SEM has often 
served economists – and by extension – society rather well. 
In recent decades, however, there has been something of a ‘behavioural revolution’ in economics. By 
observing how people make decisions in experimental settings, some well-documented anomalies of 
behaviour to the SEM have been identified, bringing into question the validity of some of its 
assumptions. These have given behavioural economists the inspiration to incorporate psychological 
insights into economic models in an attempt to better capture the way people make decisions. This 
paper presents the basic idea behind three key modifications to the standard model: loss aversion; 
present-biased preferences; and social preferences.  For each we consider an illustration of such 
behaviour; discuss the evidence that suggests people do behave in this way; consider how economic 
models have been adapted to capture these behaviours; and discuss some of their policy implications. 
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First let us define rationality. For the purpose of this paper the following definition is useful: a rational 
individual, faced with multiple options, will choose the one(s) that give her the highest payoff. This does 
not rule out, for example, an individual acting in the best interests of society even if it is not in her 
material interest to do so; the drivers of ‘value’ to individuals might be more than simply their own 
material gain, which are turned on when pro-social decisions are taken. Using this definition allows us to 
distinguish between: a) behaviour that is inconsistent with the standard model because people are not 
optimising and are being irrational; and b) departures from the standard model that involve rationalisable 
behaviour where the carrier of ‘value’ is not simply a standard utility function, but something that is more 
behaviourally influenced. Our focus is very much on the latter.1 
Loss aversion is the idea that losses loom larger than equivalent-sized gains. If people are loss averse 
and they are exposed to losses then they face particularly sharp incentives to avoid incurring them. This 
seems to be a widely reported characteristic of human behaviour which gives rise to many interesting 
conclusions.  For example, to incentivise someone to do something, rather than rewarding them upon 
completing the task, a loss averse individual is more likely to complete it if they are paid first and face 
being required to repay the payment if they fail. 
Present-biased preferences capture the idea that when considering decisions that have consequences 
in the future, the present is particularly salient and has a large impact on the decision at hand. This can 
give rise to time inconsistency: people may plan to do something in the future, but after the passage of 
time when that future becomes the present they change their plans because decision making in the here 
and now takes a different shape to decision making regarding the future. Models that incorporate this 
behaviour can shed light on procrastination and self-control problems, and, more importantly, 
mechanisms to overcome these. 
Social preferences allow economists to capture other-regarding elements to preferences that might also 
be drivers of behaviour. One of the most convincing of these is reciprocity: if an act of kindness is done 
to an individual they will gain some pleasure from reciprocating kindness with kindness, but will suffer 
displeasure if they are unkind in return. Reciprocity can temper the behaviour of people in pursuit of self-
interest. For instance, in a situation in which there are negative externalities (i.e. where people, in doing 
what is best for themselves, do harm to others) the prediction of the standard model is market failure, 
promoting an institutional response to correct it; but reciprocity may provide a self-correction mechanism 
that limits the extent to which people harm others, particularly if this is encouraged by society. 
By considering more descriptive accounts of people’s behaviour, the analysis of economic environments 
often leads to different conclusions than those drawn from a standard analysis. Consequentially, 
consideration of behavioural ideas gives rise to implications for policy. Affiliated with the UK Cabinet 
Office is the Behavioural Insights Team (established in 2010) that works to consider the implications of 
insights that stem from behavioural economics for public policy2, demonstrating the centre stage that 
behavioural economics is taking in the public policy arena. This paper aims to provide some insight into 
                                                        
1
 Very accessible discussions of the former are included in Thaler and Sunstein (2008); Kahneman (2011), which is a 
highly recommended read for anyone with an interest in behavioural economics; and Ariely (2009). 
2
 For the interested reader, their ‘Mindspace’ report on “influencing behaviour through public policy” presents an 
interesting dialogue on the broad policy implications of many aspects of behavioural economics. 
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the economics behind behavioural policy interventions to help readers make an informed assessment of 
their importance. 
II Loss Aversion: losses loom larger than gains  
A well-documented feature of human perception is that losses loom larger than equivalent-sized gains: 
the pleasure felt from gaining an amount of money is less than the displeasure of losing that same 
amount of money. This cannot be consistently captured in the SEM because it assumes that only final 
outcomes are the carriers of value. Loss aversion suggests that how an outcome compares to a 
reference point influences how it is valued. 
To capture this reference dependence, a model of preferences needs to not only consider the magnitude 
of outcomes, but also how they compare to a reference point. An outcome is coded as a gain if it 
exceeds the reference point, and as a loss if it falls short of it, and individuals seem to intrinsically 
assess gains and losses differently. Loss aversion was introduced as a central feature of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) ‘Prospect Theory’ where the reference point was taken to be status quo, the 
individual’s current state.  
The way loss aversion is captured in an economic model is straightforward. In standard preference 
representation models individuals have a utility function defined over outcomes that assigns to each 
outcome x a utility number u(x). Decision making involves comparing the utility of different options and 
choosing the one that gives the highest utility. To allow for loss aversion the outcome x is compared to a 
reference point r, and a standard utility function is augmented with a ‘gain-loss’ utility v(x-r) which can 
differ depending on whether x exceeds the reference point r (in which case x-r>0) or falls short of it (in 
which case x-r<0). An individual is loss averse if, for some y>0, -v(-y)>v(y): the gain-loss utility is steeper 
in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains, so there is a kink at the reference point.3 An 
individual's overall payoff from the outcome x is then a combination of the utility of that outcome and the 
gain-loss utility: 8[U ȘX[Y[-r) (where Ș is just a weighting parameter). 
Figure 1 plots two gain-loss utility functions for different reference points, r and ݎǁ >r. Suppose an 
individual’s reference point is r, then if an outcome represents a gain relative to this reference point she 
moves up the relatively shallow value function to the right of r; conversely, if an outcome falls short of r 
and so is judged to be a loss she moves down the relatively steep value function to the left of r. The 
disutility from a loss is larger than the utility from an equivalent-sized gain, which means that individuals 
face a sharp incentive to avoid losses. This figure also illustrates that how an outcome is evaluated 
depends on the reference point to which it is compared: relative to the reference point r the outcome x in 
the figure is a gain, but relative to the reference point ݎǁ it is a loss and is evaluated as such.  
 
 
 
                                                        
3
 Prospect theory also incorporates ‘diminishing sensitivity’: the effect of marginal gains and losses is smaller the 
larger is the gain or loss under consideration, which implies the gain-loss utility function is concave in the domain of 
gains and convex in the domain of losses. For simplicity of exposition, we consider only loss aversion here. 
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Figure 1: reference dependence and loss aversion. 
 
The evidence base that supports the concept of loss aversion is large and convincing. Early evidence 
came in the form of the ‘endowment effect’ (Kahneman et al., 1990), which noted that, on average, 
individuals require more compensation to give up a good that they have gained entitlement over than 
they would be willing to pay to acquire it. After being endowed with a good an individual perceives 
ownership of it so if they were to sell it they would suffer a loss, losses are felt strongly, and so a high 
level of compensation is required to sell the item. This is easily seen in the diagram: if r is the individual’s 
initial situation and ݎǁ incorporates acquisition of the good, the individual’s willingness to pay for the good 
is given by the height of the left value function evaluated at ݎǁ; by contrast, their willingness to accept if 
they are endowed with the good and have incorporated possession of it into their status quo, is given by 
the amount by which the right value function reduces when moving from ݎǁ to r. Loss aversion implies the 
willingness to accept exceeds the willingness to pay. 
Loss aversion has been found in many experimental settings, as well as in field studies: for example, in 
seller behaviour in the housing market (Genesove and Mayer, 2001); in physician behaviour (Rizzo and 
Zeckhauser, 2003) and police performance (Mas, 2006) in relation to pay; and in labour supply decisions 
(Camerer et al., 1997; Crawford and Meng, 2011). The evidence by no means suggests that every 
individual is loss averse; indeed, there may be distinct groups who are not. For example, List (2004) 
found that experienced market participants did not exhibit loss aversion whereas those with little 
experience did, but professional golfers – who have vast experience and are subject to large stakes – do 
tend to exhibit loss aversion (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). The phenomenon seems to be robust 
enough that it should be given careful consideration by economists when undertaking modelling 
exercises so that they can infer whether people do exhibit loss aversion, and if so assess its 
implications. 
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People make decisions based on the incentives they face: they weigh up the benefits and the costs of 
undertaking an action, compare the two, and act appropriately. If people are loss averse, they evaluate 
gains and losses differently, which means they face different incentives in the domain of losses to those 
in the domain of gains: the incentives to avoid losses are sharper. By altering the decision-making 
environment in a way that changes the reference point, people can be exposed to losses which may 
consequently lead them to change their behaviour. As such, if people are loss averse, the ‘choice 
architecture’ within which decisions are made may matter for the decisions that are taken. 
 ‘Drip pricing’ is one example of companies trying to influence reference points that recently commanded 
the attention of an Office of Fair Trading Report (OFT, 2010). Drip pricing involves the buyer not seeing 
the total price for a good when making a purchase decision; a base price is augmented with additional 
charges before the purchase can be made (for example, airline tickets with compulsory debit and credit 
card fees or theatre and concert booking fees). An experienced consumer obeying the assumptions of 
homo economicus would see through such pricing and make decisions based on the total price. For a 
loss averse consumer, once they have made the decision to make a purchase their decision shifts their 
reference point; subsequently pulling out of the purchase would imply a loss that the consumer is keen 
to avoid, making them more willing to pay the additional charges than they would be before they made 
the decision to purchase. Logically, consumers who are subjected to drip pricing may end up paying a 
total price for the good that is more than they would have chosen to pay had the total price been cited 
before their purchase decision was made.4 
For further illustration, a recent study considers the effect of appealing to loss aversion when trying to 
incentivise teachers to be more efficacious (Fryer et al., 2012). Whilst financial rewards following good 
performance had no effect on teacher performance, when teachers were paid up front and asked to 
return the money if their students under-performed, students achieved significantly better results in a 
test.5 
Later developments of models of reference-dependent preferences have allowed the reference point to 
be influenced by various features of the environment in which decisions are made: for example, by 
expectations (Shalev, 2000; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006); and by the outcome achieved by a reference 
group (e.g. Card et al. (2012)). This has further implications for behaviour and policy. For example, what 
seems like innocuous behaviour by firms might have non-obvious consequences. If a firm offers a good 
at a sale price this might act to manipulate a consumer’s future willingness to pay if they buy at the sale 
price and their expectations about consumption are influenced by what they consume. The reason is 
that if, at the next purchase opportunity, the consumer does not consume the good they will suffer a loss 
relative to their expectations, so are willing to pay a higher price to avoid the loss; their willingness to pay 
has increased, perhaps to a level that exceeds the regular price (Heidhues and Koszegi, 2014). A further 
example concerns aspirations that can be influenced by the reference group to which individuals 
compare themselves. If a person’s reference point is influenced by those around her and that group is 
currently enjoying better outcomes than the individual, then by remaining in her current state the 
individual would be suffering a loss relative to her aspirations. Since realising this loss would give 
                                                        
4
 For the reader interested in competition issues, there is a further OFT survey on consumer behavioural biases in 
competition (OFT, 2011). 
5
 Following a similar logic, the website StickK.com allows users to expose themselves to both monetary losses and 
social pressure with the aim of helping people achieve their goals; simple, but effective! 
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substantial displeasure, she faces a sharp incentive to achieve her aspirations. As such, it is more likely 
that lower performing groups will make achievements if they are exposed to influences that cause them 
to aspire to more.6 
The implications of loss aversion for behaviour and therefore policy are numerous and varied. The long-
term consequences of policy interventions should be borne in mind, however, because loss aversion 
implies there may be an asymmetric response to the introduction and elimination of policy measures if 
those policy measures generate entitlement effects that get incorporated into reference points, as might 
conceivably be the case with changes to minimum wages (Fehr et al., 2009). 
III Present-biased preferences: the best laid plans; what happens ‘when tomorrow comes’  
We now turn to discuss inter-temporal decision making, in which the consequences of a decision occur 
in multiple periods. When outcomes occur over time, economists discount those in the future to reflect 
the idea that people are impatient: other things being equal, people prefer to receive rewards sooner 
rather than later. The standard ‘discounted utility model’ proscribes that the present discounted utility of 
a stream of outcomes occurring between now and time period T is ݑ(ݔ଴) + ߜݑ(ݔଵ) + ߜଶݑ(ݔଶ) + ڮ+ ߜ்ݑ(ݔ்) 
 
An individual’s discount factor is ߜ ൑ 1: patient individuals have large discount factors and don’t discount 
the future too heavily; impatient individuals have small discount factors so outcomes that occur in the 
future are heavily discounted. Regardless of the level of impatience, the discount factor for some period t 
is ߜ௧, which is smaller the larger is t: outcomes farther into the future are more heavily discounted. A key 
feature of this model is that the additional impatience between any two consecutive periods is the same 
regardless of the time horizon: for example, the discount factor applied today is 1 (no discounting) and 
that in the following period is ߜ (the additional discount applied is ߜ/1 = ߜ); the discount factor 7 periods 
hence is ߜ଻and 8 periods hence is ߜ଼ (the additional discount applied to the later period is ߜ଼/ߜ଻ = ߜ). 
A feature of real-life decision making is that many people exhibit a present bias: when considering 
decisions at short time horizons that involve the present people tend to exhibit a high degree of 
impatience, but when thinking about consequences at long time horizons people tend to be less 
impatient.7 An example will help to illustrate. When asked whether they would choose to receive £100 
now or £110 next week, people often choose the ‘smaller sooner’ reward revealing that they are 
relatively impatient at short time horizons; when asked whether they would prefer £100 in 1 year or £110 
in 1 year and 1 week (separated by the same amount of time as the first choice), people tend to choose 
the ‘larger later’ reward. However, if £110 in 53 weeks is preferred to £100 in 52 weeks then ߜହଷ110 >ߜହଶ100 (ߜ is the weekly discount factor in this example), so ߜ > 10/11, but if £100 now is preferred to 
£110 next week then 100 > ߜ110, so ߜ < 10/11. But in the standard discounted utility model individuals 
have a single discount factor that is meant to capture their time preferences; such behaviour is 
inconsistent with the standard model. 
                                                        
6
 Genicot and Ray (2014) undertake a careful analysis of aspirations in relation to aggregate outcomes, and in 
particular consider the effect on inequality of only moderate aspirations being effective in incentivising people to 
achieve more (due to diminishing sensitivity in the gain-loss value function). 
7
 Frederick et al. (2002) discuss the body of evidence that supports this idea. 
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This pattern of behaviour is an example of ‘time inconsistency’ because an individual that makes such 
choices would plan that in a year’s time they would wait and take the ‘larger later’ reward; however, after 
the passage of a year if asked the same question again they would choose to take the ‘smaller sooner’ 
reward, since that is what they would choose now. What seems to be the case is that for decisions at 
short time horizons, and particularly for decisions that involve the present, people are more impatient 
than they are at longer time horizons. Individuals exhibit a ‘present bias’ that gives rise to the time 
inconsistency: plans can be made at long time horizons, but when it actually comes to making the 
decision to enact that plan (after the passage of time) this happens in the present and the evaluation of 
that decision changes. 
To try to capture this present bias behavioural economists have turned to alternative models of 
discounting for time. Perhaps the most appealing, because of its simplicity, is Laibson’s (1997) ’quasi-
hyperbolic’ discounting model.8 This introduces a single additional parameter, ߚ ൑ 1, into the discounting 
model that lowers the weight of all periods in the future by changing the discount applied to any period ݐ ൒ 1 from ߜ௧ to ߚߜ௧; put another way, it increases the (relative) weight attached to the present. Under 
so-called (ߚ, ߜ) െpreferences the present discounted utility of the same stream of outcomes considered 
above is:  
 ݑ(ݔ଴) + ߚߜݑ(ݔଵ) + ߚߜଶݑ(ݔଶ) + ڮ+ ߚߜ்ݑ(ݔ்) 
 
This is a really simple, but very clever, modification since it captures the present bias that gives rise to 
time inconsistency in a single present-bias parameter, ߚ. 
Take the example used previously: if an individual prefers £110 in 53 weeks to £100 in 52 weeks then ߚߜହଷ110 > ߚߜହଶ100 so ߜ > 10/11 (the ߚs cancel). If £100 is chosen now over £110 in 1 week then 
100 > ߚߜ110, which is consistent with ߜ > 10/11 so long as ߚ is sufficiently small, i.e. there is a strong 
enough present bias to preferences. By capturing present bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting allows us to 
understand the extent to which people might plan to do things (“in one year I will wait another week to 
get £110”) but then renege on those plans after the passage of time (when one year has passed “I want 
£100 now”). 
The behavioural insight of present bias, which implies time inconsistency and is captured by the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model, is important because it can explain the mechanism through which people 
suffer from self-control problems that are associated with the behaviours of ‘procrastination’ (putting off 
until later a costly activity) and ‘prepropriation’ (bringing forward rewarding activities for instant 
gratification). To see this, consider a costly activity that brings subsequent benefits (such as 
exercising)9: the cost is c and the benefit which is received in the following period is b. An individual, 
when planning to do exercise in, say, 5 days’ time will do so if the (appropriately discounted) cost is less 
than the benefit, i.e. if ߚߜହܿ < ߚߜ଺ܾ, which will be the case so long as the benefit is sufficiently greater 
than the cost and the individual is not too impatient (ܿ < ߜܾ). However, after the passage of 5 days when 
it actually comes to doing the exercise the cost to be incurred on that day is particularly salient, and they 
                                                        
8
 A different approach to modelling present-biased preferences considers individuals as having dual selves – a long 
term planning self and a sequence of short term decision-making selves – see Fudenberg and Levine (2006). 
9
 The notation of DellaVigna (2009) is followed in this discussion. 
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will exercise only if ܿ < ߚߜܾ. If the individual suffers from a present bias and ߚ < 1 it may very well be 
the case that whilst ܿ < ߜܾ implying the individual plans to do exercise, ܿ > ߚߜܾ so when the planned 
exercise day arrives they choose not to.  
People with a present bias plan to do things that subsequently don't get done: they suffer from a self-
control problem. When it comes to carrying out the plan, costs must be incurred now, and whilst there 
are subsequent benefits, the salience of the cost due to the present bias means the benefit may be 
insufficient to motivate them to do it, even if they planned to. People procrastinate; they put off until later 
something that should, in their long-term interests, be done today. 
The extent to which people understand their self-control problems can be captured by considering an 
individual’s perception of their true present bias, ߚመ ൒ ߚ. Someone is said to be sophisticated if they 
perfectly understand their present bias and subsequent self-control problem (i.e.  ߚመ = ߚ), and is said to 
be (partially) naïve if they over-estimate their self-control (ߚመ > ߚ). A sophisticated individual understands 
that they have a self-control problem and will not be surprised when they subsequently procrastinate. 
Naïve individuals will be surprised in some circumstances: they will make plans fully anticipating 
following them through, not recognising that they over-estimated their ability to stay in control. 
In an interesting study by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), the gym attendance patterns among 
members of health clubs in the US were considered. Despite there being a pay-as-you-go membership 
option, the ex post average price per visit of members who signed up to a monthly contract was 
substantially higher than the pay-per-visit fee. This suggests that at the planning phase, when deciding 
which contract to purchase, members over-estimate their gym usage, consistent with people exhibiting 
present-biased preferences and being partially naïve to their self-control problem.  
By accounting for present bias in economic models we can understand and begin to think about the 
consequences of procrastination. One fairly obvious consequence is that, if people are faced with a 
decision problem in which a choice has to be made, they may procrastinate over making a decision even 
though the transaction cost is small and there are substantial subsequent benefits from making a 
decision (such as joining a pension scheme). This implies that default options for decisions will matter 
and that careful consideration should be given to what the default option is. In an early study of pension 
choices, Madrian and Shea (2001) considered the effect of an opt-out system (with a default saving 
plan), rather than an opt-in system: under the opt-out system 90% joined immediately and 98% after 3 
years; whereas with the opt-in system only 20% joined after 3 months and 65% after 3 years. Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) in their book Nudge champion the idea of default options as a simple, almost costless, 
policy tweak that can have dramatic effects, and there is a significant body of evidence in the recent 
literature to suggest that this is so. 
By a similar logic to the idea behind procrastination, people may also engage in enjoying the instant 
gratification of a pleasurable activity that gives rise to subsequent costs, even though they plan not to do 
so, i.e. they prepropriate rewards. It seems, then, rather surprising that the UK Government in the 2014 
Budget announced flexibility for pensioners in respect of their retirement savings, allowing them to 
withdraw their pension pot upon retirement. All very libertarian, but whilst pensioners may plan to be 
sensible with their money at the point of retirement, when it comes to acting on their plan they will 
require great strength of will; the temptation to prepropriate for instant gratification is clear and present. 
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For instance, a recent study linking the level of credit card borrowing with present bias suggests that 
people with present bias do prepropriate consumption, more so if their present bias is stronger (Meier 
and Sprenger, 2010). Understanding the extent of people’s present bias through the lens of a model 
incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting could allow economists to predict the additional spending that 
will take place around retirement, and the subsequent gap in income that may emerge in later years.  
Such analysis should certainly be borne in mind by policy makers when assessing the implications of 
such radical policy changes in, for example, pension arrangements – especially as any future income 
shortfalls may in all likelihood be borne in part by the State. 
A further point of consideration for policy makers to bear in mind relates to commitment. If people are 
sufficiently aware that they suffer from a self-control problem then at the planning stage they will have 
some idea that they will engage in procrastination/prepropriation at the point of carrying out decisions, 
and might be able to take actions to help them stay in control. For example, a field study of savings 
behaviour by Ashraf et al. (2006) reported in an aptly-titled paper “Tying Odysseus to the mast” found 
that savings rates of those individuals offered special accounts that allowed for some commitment to 
monthly saving were significantly higher than for individuals left to their own devices. In relation to gym 
attendance discussed earlier, another explanation is that people buy a monthly membership to sink the 
financial cost of going to the gym that encourages them to go more than they otherwise would. If people 
are presented with an opportunity at the planning stage to either tie their hands in respect of their future 
decision, or to alter their future incentives making it more favourable to complete the task they plan to 
undertake when the time arrives, individuals who are sufficiently aware of their self-control problems can 
overcome them. Providing such commitment opportunities is a simple way to help people make better 
decisions that are in their long-term interests. 
IV Social Preferences: self-interest or the common good; competition or co-operation? 
Economic models have traditionally made the assumption that individuals care only about their own 
material self-interest. There is, however, a body of convincing evidence suggesting that some people 
care about more than simply themselves.10 Behavioural economists have worked to capture this by 
considering, in addition to material self-interest, ‘other-regarding elements’ to preferences. The pleasure 
someone derives from an outcome depends not only on the material value to that individual, but how 
achieving that outcome sits within a societal context. For example, people might derive pleasure from 
acts of altruism or displeasure from taking actions that lead to increased inequality or that contrast with 
accepted norms of behaviour. These issues, and their implications, are perhaps most easily illustrated 
using the ‘ultimatum game’ (Güth et al., 1982). In the ultimatum game there are two individuals, a 
proposer and a responder; the proposer is given a ‘pie’ (e.g. an amount of money), and has to make an 
offer of a share of this pie to the responder; the responder then has to decide whether to accept this 
share, in which case the proposer and responder leave with the suggested shares, or reject it, in which 
case both leave with nothing (players know the rules before play begins). Under the SEM the responder 
should accept any share, no matter how small; the proposer should reason that this is the case and so 
should offer a tiny share of the pie retaining the vast majority for herself, and the responder should 
accept. 
                                                        
10
 This literature is too vast to survey here; Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) give a good overview. 
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In general, this is far from what is observed when the ultimatum game is played in experimental settings 
(see, e.g., Thaler (1988)). Proposers tend to make significant offers to responders, and responders 
sometimes reject substantial offers. This behaviour can be explained in a number of ways. 1) Proposers 
may be altruistic and derive a ‘warm glow’ from the act of giving something to the responder (Andreoni, 
1990); they are willing to sacrifice their personal material payoff to experience the warm glow. 2) Both 
proposers and responders might be inequity averse: receiving more or less than others in society gives 
some disutility (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This implies people are willing to sacrifice their material payoff 
to achieve more equal outcomes, so proposers may propose substantial shares to ensure the outcome 
is more equal, and responders might reject particularly unequal shares to avoid increased inequality 
despite foregoing the share that was offered. 3) Responders might exhibit reciprocity: some pleasure is 
gained by reciprocating fair behaviour with fair behaviour (positive reciprocity) and unfair behaviour with 
unfair behaviour (negative reciprocity), and likewise displeasure is felt if an individual behaves unfairly to 
those they perceive have treated them fairly, and vice versa (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). 
If a responder engages in reciprocity and she judges the proposer’s offer to be unkind she may reject 
the offer since the pleasure she derives from reciprocating with an unkind act (rejecting leaves the 
proposer with nothing) is larger than the material payoff from acceptance of the small offer. Fearing that 
unfair offers will be rejected tempers the behaviour of the proposer since she needs to ensure her offer 
is perceived to be fair for it to be accepted. 4) Both proposers and responders might be influenced by 
social norms (see, e.g., Young (2007)); some disutility will be felt by straying from what is deemed by 
society to be acceptable behaviour. If sharing is a social norm, both proposers and responders may take 
actions to concord with this accepted behaviour (proposers by making substantial offers, responders by 
rejecting insubstantial offers) even if it reduces their material payoff. 
Having summarised some of the main ideas that behavioural economists have advanced in considering 
social elements of behaviour, we now turn to consider some of the implications of taking social 
preferences into account. By accounting for the influence of such motivations we can capture the idea 
that individuals are potentially constrained in their actions by a comparison with both internal and 
external norms of behaviour. Reciprocity and social norms seem particularly convincing explanations: if 
an individual is motivated by reciprocity she may not pursue activities that are in her self-interest if this 
involves being unfair to someone who is perceived to have acted in a fair way, as this violates an 
internal norm of behaviour. Likewise, if individuals are motivated by social norms they may not pursue 
acts that are in their self-interest if the actions contrast with what is believed to be acceptable behaviour 
by society, i.e. external norms. 
It is useful at this point to outline two scenarios from game theory that provide an effective 
representation of many of the environments encountered in settings where social behaviour is important. 
The first is the classic ‘Prisoners' Dilemma’, in which two (or more) individuals have to choose whether to 
‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’, all individuals face a material incentive to defect regardless of what they think 
others will do, and when any individual acts in their own best interests they do substantial harm to others 
(i.e. there are negative externalities). If individuals pursue their own self-interest they choose to defect, 
but then each will be doing harm to the other and the collective outcome will be inferior to what could be 
achieved by cooperating. This is represented in the left panel of Figure 2; given the incentives the 
equilibrium involves both individuals defecting so each achieves a payoff of 1, even though both players 
could achieve a payoff of 2 if they cooperate. In the right panel of Figure 2 a somewhat different scenario 
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is considered, in which the only change is that the payoff from defecting when the other cooperates has 
been reduced from 3 to 1. This is a ‘Stag Hunt’ in which each player can achieve a relatively low payoff 
regardless of what their adversary does by defecting (the analogy is to go hare hunting; a small but 
guaranteed gain); larger gains are possible by cooperating, but they can only be achieved if both players 
cooperate (the analogy is to go stag hunting; the gain is large, but a stag cannot be caught single-
handedly). From a situation of mutual cooperation, there is no incentive for any player in this game to 
defect, so in contrast to the prisoners’ dilemma mutual cooperation is an equilibrium. Mutual defection is 
also an equilibrium, so in the parlance of game theory there is a coordination problem, but one that 
should be relatively straightforward to solve since the equilibrium in which players cooperate payoff-
dominates that in which they defect: if people have sufficient confidence that others will cooperate, they 
will choose to cooperate as well.  
 
Figure 2: A Prisoners’ Dilemma in the left panel, and a Stag Hunt game in the right panel. In each 
game two players A and B decide whether to cooperate or defect. A chooses between the rows 
of the matrix, B the columns. Each cell of the matrix corresponds to a potential outcome, and in 
each cell the payoffs to the two players are listed, the first number being the payoff to player A, 
the second that of player B. 
 
In many scenarios in the real world pursuing self-interest harms the common good and the material 
incentives people face concur with those in the prisoners’ dilemma. If people do pursue their material 
incentives this is at the expense of society, which leaves society with a problem. Prisoners’ dilemma-
type scenarios imply a market failure, to which there should be an institutional response to enforce the 
cooperative outcome to make society better off: decisions should be taken out of the hands of the 
members of society through acts of formal governance. 
However, if we take the view that people are motivated not only by material self-interest but also by 
internal and external norms of behaviour, the picture is perhaps rosier. In a prisoners’ dilemma, when an 
individual pursues their self-interest by defecting they do harm to others (since there are negative 
externalities). If doing so conflicts with either internal or external norms of behaviour there will be a 
psychological cost. This reduces the payoff of defecting from 3 to, say, 3 െ ܿ; if this cost is large enough 
the overall payoff will fall short of 2, in which case the incentive to defect disappears. If the psychological 
cost exceeds 1 then the structure of the game in psychological payoffs is not a prisoners’ dilemma, but a 
stag hunt, in which the cooperative outcome is an equilibrium. So long as the material benefits from 
defecting on cooperation are not too large and the psychological cost of defecting on cooperation is 
large enough, members of society will find it in their own interests to act in the best interests of society, 
so long as they believe others will. If this is the case then the institutional response should be to promote 
cooperation by supporting reciprocity, nurturing social norms and communicating the extent of 
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cooperative behaviour, which is a very different response to formal governance that requires legal or 
other formal sanctions. 
Whether individuals will act pro-socially in situations that materially look like a prisoners’ dilemma but 
where their actions are tempered by the constraints of internal and external norms of behaviour depends 
on the size of the material gain, and the psychological cost of defecting (amongst many other factors). If 
people are unconstrained by social preferences they will never act pro-socially. However, if people are 
subject to fairness concerns embodied in reciprocity, and are influenced by social norms that contrast 
with pursuing self-interest at the expense of others, society may very well be able to be self-regulating 
without recourse to formal governance. From a vast body of research investigating this issue, we have 
some understanding of the drivers behind pro-social behaviour (see, for example, Ostrom (2005)), but 
there is no widely applicable universal truth. In situations where policy makers identify a market failure 
and consider an institutional response of formal governance, they should also carefully consider whether 
people’s intrinsic motivation can be appealed to and strengthened to enable society to resolve its own 
problems without recourse to formal sanctions.  In addition, where people are behaving pro-socially, 
policy makers should be careful not introduce material motivations or issue instructions on how to 
behave that may ‘crowd-out’ existing intrinsic motivation and hence inadvertently discourage people 
from behaving pro-socially (Frey, 2012). 
V Conclusions 
The standard economic model does a good job of explaining how some people behave, and given its 
generality and tractability has served economists – and society – well. However, the well-documented 
and consistent evidence pointing out its flaws should not be ignored if economists are to provide more 
accurate models of behaviour and hence help policy-makers design policy ‘that works’. By incorporating 
insights from psychology, experiments and field observations, more accurate models of behaviour can 
be constructed that can be used to better understand how people act in economic environments and 
how they might respond to changes in those environments through policy interventions. 
However, behavioural economics is not without its critics, some of whom are behavioural economists 
themselves, who are critical of some of the methodologies used and their consequent insights. There is, 
for example, concern that the findings from experiments that are conducted in decision laboratories are 
not generalisable to the real world and so only deductions from field studies should be used to inform 
insight into how people actually behave. This is a healthy debate that promotes high-quality academic 
work in behavioural economics; hence there are an increasing number of field studies, and the issue of 
control in experimental settings is under particular scrutiny. 
Developing a better understanding of people’s behaviour is critically important in assessing the 
economic value of policy interventions and in identifying new policy approaches and levers through 
which change can be enacted. A main focus of this paper has been to explain the economic models that 
capture behavioural insights, because an understanding of the mechanisms at work is crucial to 
understanding the importance of taking departures from the standard approach into account and the 
applicability of ideas to new and different settings.  
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Behavioural economics has certainly come of age as an academic sub-discipline in economics over the 
past two decades.  Most encouragingly it has extended its influence into a wide variety of critically 
important policy fields, be that in labour market policy, social policy, pensions and savings policy or 
competition policy.  Given its relatively recent existence, behavioural economics has a strong and 
growing presence in the analysis and evaluation of public policy in the UK and internationally – and this 
will only grow as fundamentally most public policy is about effecting change in peoples’ behaviours and 
in societal outcomes. 
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